I have been reading about feminist epistemology and I wanted to ask the class what they thought.
There are many aspects to feminist epistemology, but the one upon which I would like to focus is the claim that there is a sort of "feminine cognitive style and mode of knowledge." Supposedly, the central concept of feminist epistemology is that of a situated knower, and thus of situated knowledge. That is, knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject. What confuses me is how knowledge would do such a thing. To know something is to hold a belief that is true, and that you are justified in holding. In short, Knowledge = Justified, True, Belief. Perspective might shape beliefs; the fact of which beliefs we hold and why might be an artifact of such individual specifics. This, though, would not be reflected in our knowledge, for the justification and truth criteria would likely not reflect such specifics as the gender of the person holding the belief.
These are but some precritical ramblings. What do you think about feminist epistemology. Is there a feminine cognitive style and mode of knowledge?
Jacob Wheeler
Jacob Wheeler
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Saturday, March 24, 2012
I apologize for the tardiness of this post. I shan't bother you with excuses.
Topic for today: Judit Polgar. I was analyzing a chess game yesterday; one of my more arcane hobbies. The game was one of Polgar's best. Judit is a Hungarian chess grandmaster and her work on the board is an exercise not only in proficiency but beauty. The relevance here is that I remembered signing up for my first chess tournament in which the form allowed me to choose, if I was female, the female section of the tournament. It struck me as odd, even then as an ignorant youth, that we should divide an activity, a purely mental activity into two engendered sections. It shows that despite our immense progress on gender issues, there is much work yet to be done. Chess is in no way a physical activity, not that there would exist merit in the distinction if it were, but it deflates some of the more convoluted "women are physically inferior" arguments. Polgar is not merely the best female chess player; she is one of the best chess players in the world. Should she be in a different section than Anand and Carlson? I think not.
Topic for today: Judit Polgar. I was analyzing a chess game yesterday; one of my more arcane hobbies. The game was one of Polgar's best. Judit is a Hungarian chess grandmaster and her work on the board is an exercise not only in proficiency but beauty. The relevance here is that I remembered signing up for my first chess tournament in which the form allowed me to choose, if I was female, the female section of the tournament. It struck me as odd, even then as an ignorant youth, that we should divide an activity, a purely mental activity into two engendered sections. It shows that despite our immense progress on gender issues, there is much work yet to be done. Chess is in no way a physical activity, not that there would exist merit in the distinction if it were, but it deflates some of the more convoluted "women are physically inferior" arguments. Polgar is not merely the best female chess player; she is one of the best chess players in the world. Should she be in a different section than Anand and Carlson? I think not.
Friday, March 9, 2012
Religious Sanity
The opinion was expressed on Wednesday that all religions are crazy and that they are all crazy to congruent degrees of craziness. I would like to address this claim, but I shall treat it as two separate claims and thus respond to them in that manner. As a preface, I consider myself an atheistic agnostic.
"All religions are crazy."
This is an un-nuanced understanding of religion. I would proffer that such a view is strictly incorrect but I shall refrain from doing so until some terms are clarified. It seems that the term 'crazy' requires some elucidation by means of definition. Furthermore, was the intent to ascribe craziness to all religions themselves or the institutionalized forms thereof? My objections to this view will be applicable to both religions themselves and the institutions. In what manner are religions crazy? The most obvious answer would be that maybe they, the adherents thereof, believe in something for which there is inadequate evidence? I, for one, do not contend that this is sufficient to call someone crazy. Seeking a supernatural answer to questions for which science is thus far insufficient is not, I think, necessarily crazy. The tenets of Christianity, the teachings of Christ, for example, are mostly very sane.
"All religions are equally crazy."
Equally nuanced. There is much sense in comparing the relative sanity, while we're still using that term, of religions. There is a marked difference between the sensibility of reformed Judaism compared to some orthodox, conservative protestant sects. Scientology, for instance, strikes me as significantly more inane than many other religions.
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Disagreeing with the ontological position of people of faith does not afford us the privilege to categorically dismiss them as insane. It is insulting and demeans us as much as it does them.
"All religions are crazy."
This is an un-nuanced understanding of religion. I would proffer that such a view is strictly incorrect but I shall refrain from doing so until some terms are clarified. It seems that the term 'crazy' requires some elucidation by means of definition. Furthermore, was the intent to ascribe craziness to all religions themselves or the institutionalized forms thereof? My objections to this view will be applicable to both religions themselves and the institutions. In what manner are religions crazy? The most obvious answer would be that maybe they, the adherents thereof, believe in something for which there is inadequate evidence? I, for one, do not contend that this is sufficient to call someone crazy. Seeking a supernatural answer to questions for which science is thus far insufficient is not, I think, necessarily crazy. The tenets of Christianity, the teachings of Christ, for example, are mostly very sane.
"All religions are equally crazy."
Equally nuanced. There is much sense in comparing the relative sanity, while we're still using that term, of religions. There is a marked difference between the sensibility of reformed Judaism compared to some orthodox, conservative protestant sects. Scientology, for instance, strikes me as significantly more inane than many other religions.
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Disagreeing with the ontological position of people of faith does not afford us the privilege to categorically dismiss them as insane. It is insulting and demeans us as much as it does them.
Sunday, February 26, 2012
Questions on Beauvoir
While reading this latest section, I had a few minor (not deserving of a slap) questions on Beauvoir, her practices, and her beliefs.
1.) I have been assuming that the use of the gender specificity, which predominates this work, has been, to some degree, and artifact of the translation. It has become apparent, though, that she does sometimes use the pronoun to speak of, as would be expected of such a work and its topic, the male sex generally. There are also sentences that would seem to hint that the use of 'men' in that particular instance is intended to refer to all of humanity. Now, should I be reading the pronouns and noun very specifically, that is, that she is using 'he' and 'his' and 'men' only when referring to men? Or, is there some alternative way of reading Beauvoir that will afford me the luxury of knowing when she is speaking of men and when of people in general? This is not a criticism; I find, though, the answer to this is essential for understanding.
2.) Beauvoir, in the first chapter of section three, mentions the 'genesis myth'. I am left wondering what her religious views are. Does she believe in god? If so, does she identify with a particular religion? If so, which one? I know she is a dominant figure of existentialism, and despite some charges to the contrary, I do not believe that entails an ontological view of god. This one is less essential for understanding but a curiosity nonetheless.
1.) I have been assuming that the use of the gender specificity, which predominates this work, has been, to some degree, and artifact of the translation. It has become apparent, though, that she does sometimes use the pronoun to speak of, as would be expected of such a work and its topic, the male sex generally. There are also sentences that would seem to hint that the use of 'men' in that particular instance is intended to refer to all of humanity. Now, should I be reading the pronouns and noun very specifically, that is, that she is using 'he' and 'his' and 'men' only when referring to men? Or, is there some alternative way of reading Beauvoir that will afford me the luxury of knowing when she is speaking of men and when of people in general? This is not a criticism; I find, though, the answer to this is essential for understanding.
2.) Beauvoir, in the first chapter of section three, mentions the 'genesis myth'. I am left wondering what her religious views are. Does she believe in god? If so, does she identify with a particular religion? If so, which one? I know she is a dominant figure of existentialism, and despite some charges to the contrary, I do not believe that entails an ontological view of god. This one is less essential for understanding but a curiosity nonetheless.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
The Other
Beauvoir speaks much on the conceptualization of Woman as 'other'. I am struggling with exactly what is meant by this moniker, but with some thoughts of mine on a previous post and a contribution by Alexandra, I want to try to work through but one facet thereof.
I think that a feeling of alterity can be extremely healthy especially when paired with a comprehensive understanding of similarities as well. It is important to understand how we are different from those around us; it is through such comprehension that tolerance and empathy is begotten. What is concerning is that alterity seems to be applied to women only which is patently false. In a nigh tautological fashion, if women are other, then so too must men. If we have two letters A and B, we cannot claim that B is the other letter without also noting that A is also an other letter from B.
While alterity and difference are important, it is more important to note the bi-directionality of otherness.
I think that a feeling of alterity can be extremely healthy especially when paired with a comprehensive understanding of similarities as well. It is important to understand how we are different from those around us; it is through such comprehension that tolerance and empathy is begotten. What is concerning is that alterity seems to be applied to women only which is patently false. In a nigh tautological fashion, if women are other, then so too must men. If we have two letters A and B, we cannot claim that B is the other letter without also noting that A is also an other letter from B.
While alterity and difference are important, it is more important to note the bi-directionality of otherness.
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Female Identity
De Beauvoir makes the point that the first thing she cognizes when she thinks of herself is that she is a woman. She is also right that males do not do this: my first thought is, though maybe slightly revealing here, is that I am intelligent. (This is no claim of pomp and arrogance; I am no genius) I am left wondering why the discrepancy? Also, is this healthy for women to do, or should we, as a society attempt to move to a place where gender is more irrelevant?
Knowing little enough about this, I am assuming that it is actually the oppression of women that begot this tendency for Beauvoir to think of herself as such. It would not be as irrelevant if men did not spend so much of history attempting to subjugate them.
I do not know if it is healthy though. I want to arrive at a place where gender is both irrelevant and yet there are some important differences between men and women. As long as women can give birth and men cannot, gender will never be irrelevant.
Knowing little enough about this, I am assuming that it is actually the oppression of women that begot this tendency for Beauvoir to think of herself as such. It would not be as irrelevant if men did not spend so much of history attempting to subjugate them.
I do not know if it is healthy though. I want to arrive at a place where gender is both irrelevant and yet there are some important differences between men and women. As long as women can give birth and men cannot, gender will never be irrelevant.
Friday, February 10, 2012
Rawls and Religion
As we discussed in class there does seem to be, as identified by Okin, a conflict between the freedom of religion and the equality of genders. If we were to accept the fundamentalist sexism as child abuse, the state would be forced, morally, to intervene. Rawls' toleration goes slightly too far.
What I find fascinating is the possibility of considering dogmatic insistence on poorly formed epistemologies as potentially damaging psychological phenomena. I am tempted to think that it is. If we were to accept this, then the state would be forced to intervene in the teaching of religions, at least those that preach the existence of a god.
Is it too far fetched to consider the inculcation of children into religions sects child abuse?
What I find fascinating is the possibility of considering dogmatic insistence on poorly formed epistemologies as potentially damaging psychological phenomena. I am tempted to think that it is. If we were to accept this, then the state would be forced to intervene in the teaching of religions, at least those that preach the existence of a god.
Is it too far fetched to consider the inculcation of children into religions sects child abuse?
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