Ideology as Pejorative

There were, quite literally, a plethora of claims within this last reading with which I took issue; I shall here address but one of them.  Seller defines ideology as "a system of beliefs, including values, which servers a particular group's interests" (171).  I am wondering whether there is any good reason to think this an adequate definition.  The last stipulation seems unnecessary and incorrect.  There are plenty of ideologies that are harmful to the people who hold them, and thus do not serve the particular group's interests.  This stipulation seems to denote that ideologies, which could be true, are systems of beliefs that are held not by virtue of veracity, but by some pragmatic advantageous reason to do so.

But in the consideration of certain ideologies, let us say political conservatism in the form of libertarianism, does not benefit all libertarians.  In fact, in light of the dreadful effects policy influenced by this ideology would have on the entire country, libertarianism is a harmful ideology to all, including those who hold it.  I do acknowledge that some libertarians such as sociopathic CEOs do benefit, but the large majority of libertarians are demonstrably detrimented.

So is there any good reason to think that an ideology necessarily benefits the group holding it as Seller contends it does?

Autonomy

The Assiter piece greatly confused me this week. I know I missed class on Wed because of my torn back muscle, and so if we went over this in class, I apologize.

Assiter contends that all pornography is a violation of autonomy even if the participants are willing. This is enough confusion right there. How would it violate my ability to self-legislate if I do it willingly?

Her explanation is indebted to Kant who claims that all violations of autonomy consist of, at least in part, treating another person as means to an end. Pornography does just that, uses at least one person as means to the end of an other. This is an invalid form though:

If V then M
M
----
V

Where V: One person violates the autonomy of another. M: One person treats another person as means to an end.

The form is a fallacy of affirming the consequent. I wonder, though, if her conclusion is true regardless of the logical form.

Feminist Epistemology

I have been reading about feminist epistemology and I wanted to ask the class what they thought.

There are many aspects to feminist epistemology, but the one upon which I would like to focus is the claim that there is a sort of "feminine cognitive style and mode of knowledge." Supposedly, the central concept of feminist epistemology is that of a situated knower, and thus of situated knowledge. That is, knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject. What confuses me is how knowledge would do such a thing. To know something is to hold a belief that is true, and that you are justified in holding. In short, Knowledge = Justified, True, Belief. Perspective might shape beliefs; the fact of which beliefs we hold and why might be an artifact of such individual specifics. This, though, would not be reflected in our knowledge, for the justification and truth criteria would likely not reflect such specifics as the gender of the person holding the belief.

These are but some precritical ramblings. What do you think about feminist epistemology. Is there a feminine cognitive style and mode of knowledge?

I apologize for the tardiness of this post. I shan't bother you with excuses.

Topic for today: Judit Polgar. I was analyzing a chess game yesterday; one of my more arcane hobbies. The game was one of Polgar's best. Judit is a Hungarian chess grandmaster and her work on the board is an exercise not only in proficiency but beauty. The relevance here is that I remembered signing up for my first chess tournament in which the form allowed me to choose, if I was female, the female section of the tournament. It struck me as odd, even then as an ignorant youth, that we should divide an activity, a purely mental activity into two engendered sections. It shows that despite our immense progress on gender issues, there is much work yet to be done. Chess is in no way a physical activity, not that there would exist merit in the distinction if it were, but it deflates some of the more convoluted "women are physically inferior" arguments. Polgar is not merely the best female chess player; she is one of the best chess players in the world. Should she be in a different section than Anand and Carlson? I think not.

Religious Sanity

The opinion was expressed on Wednesday that all religions are crazy and that they are all crazy to congruent degrees of craziness. I would like to address this claim, but I shall treat it as two separate claims and thus respond to them in that manner. As a preface, I consider myself an atheistic agnostic.

"All religions are crazy."

This is an un-nuanced understanding of religion. I would proffer that such a view is strictly incorrect but I shall refrain from doing so until some terms are clarified. It seems that the term 'crazy' requires some elucidation by means of definition. Furthermore, was the intent to ascribe craziness to all religions themselves or the institutionalized forms thereof? My objections to this view will be applicable to both religions themselves and the institutions. In what manner are religions crazy? The most obvious answer would be that maybe they, the adherents thereof, believe in something for which there is inadequate evidence? I, for one, do not contend that this is sufficient to call someone crazy. Seeking a supernatural answer to questions for which science is thus far insufficient is not, I think, necessarily crazy. The tenets of Christianity, the teachings of Christ, for example, are mostly very sane.

"All religions are equally crazy."

Equally nuanced. There is much sense in comparing the relative sanity, while we're still using that term, of religions. There is a marked difference between the sensibility of reformed Judaism compared to some orthodox, conservative protestant sects. Scientology, for instance, strikes me as significantly more inane than many other religions.

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Disagreeing with the ontological position of people of faith does not afford us the privilege to categorically dismiss them as insane. It is insulting and demeans us as much as it does them.

Questions on Beauvoir

While reading this latest section, I had a few minor (not deserving of a slap) questions on Beauvoir, her practices, and her beliefs.

1.) I have been assuming that the use of the gender specificity, which predominates this work, has been, to some degree, and artifact of the translation. It has become apparent, though, that she does sometimes use the pronoun to speak of, as would be expected of such a work and its topic, the male sex generally. There are also sentences that would seem to hint that the use of 'men' in that particular instance is intended to refer to all of humanity. Now, should I be reading the pronouns and noun very specifically, that is, that she is using 'he' and 'his' and 'men' only when referring to men? Or, is there some alternative way of reading Beauvoir that will afford me the luxury of knowing when she is speaking of men and when of people in general? This is not a criticism; I find, though, the answer to this is essential for understanding.

2.) Beauvoir, in the first chapter of section three, mentions the 'genesis myth'. I am left wondering what her religious views are. Does she believe in god? If so, does she identify with a particular religion? If so, which one? I know she is a dominant figure of existentialism, and despite some charges to the contrary, I do not believe that entails an ontological view of god. This one is less essential for understanding but a curiosity nonetheless.

The Other

Beauvoir speaks much on the conceptualization of Woman as 'other'. I am struggling with exactly what is meant by this moniker, but with some thoughts of mine on a previous post and a contribution by Alexandra, I want to try to work through but one facet thereof.

I think that a feeling of alterity can be extremely healthy especially when paired with a comprehensive understanding of similarities as well. It is important to understand how we are different from those around us; it is through such comprehension that tolerance and empathy is begotten. What is concerning is that alterity seems to be applied to women only which is patently false. In a nigh tautological fashion, if women are other, then so too must men. If we have two letters A and B, we cannot claim that B is the other letter without also noting that A is also an other letter from B.

While alterity and difference are important, it is more important to note the bi-directionality of otherness.